Applicability of the agreement: the agreement applies only to “a person (who) has imposed a prison sentence in a prison or prison institute” (Articles III bis) and IV, point a)) and is therefore not applicable to a person detained awaiting trial. See UNITED States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711-12 (9. Cir.), cert. United States v Evans, 423 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff`d, 556 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1977). Since the agreement applies only to an inmate based on a spent “charge, information or complaint” requiring “procedure” (Article III A) and IV, point a), the agreement does not apply to an inmate on the basis of a parole warrant.
See Reed, supra. The parole procedure is presented in 18 United States.C 4214 (b). The agreement also does not apply to probation agreements. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985). The agreement also provides that, when a prisoner seeks an injunction for a case for which an inmate has been filed, he applies for an order on all matters for which the detainees have been submitted by the same “[S]tate”. Article III, point (d).
In this context, the various federal districts have been referred to as separate “[S]tates. See UNITED States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806 (4. Cir. 1979), cert. The agreement does not authorize prosecutions for other charges for which no detainee has been detained unless they arise from the same transaction. [Article V, point d) ] It is not clear whether the trial of the latter is mandatory. Article III of the agreement allows a prisoner to definitively arrest an unsolved charge, information or complaint against him in another state on the basis of which a detainee has been laid against him. Article IV allows the Crown of a state in which an unproven indictment, information or complaint is pending, to obtain temporary health detention for a prisoner against whom it has filed a detainee by filing a “written application” for conservatory custody with the incarcerated state. Article V provides for a detailed procedure for obtaining temporary conservatory custody. In addition, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 requires, at 18 Us.C.
3161 (j) that a U.S. prosecutor, who knows that an accused is serving a sentence in a penitentiary, must immediately receive the presence of the accused for the trial or bring an inmate to hire him. If the detainee requests a trial and is prosecuted, the Speedy Trial Act deadlines apply, but do not begin to run “until the accused is actually present for the purposes of oral argument.” See H.R.Rep. 93-1508, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 36. In the event of a conflict between the deadline provided by the agreement and the Speedy Trial Act, enforcement should be stricter. United States vs. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 356-57 n.
24 (1978). See Odom, supra, 231 (The Detainer Act and the Speedy Trial Act deal with the same subject matter. To the extent possible, the interpretation of the Acts of the Apostles should not be contradictory. »). The agreement applies to the transfer of prisoners convicted of independent processes between two states, as well as transfers from the federal government to the states and from the states to the federal government.